We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations in a fair manner. Envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is arguably the most compelling fairness concept for this problem. However, despite significant efforts by many researchers for several years, its existence has not been settled beyond the simple case of two agents. In this paper, we break this barrier by showing that an EFX allocation always exists for three agents! Our proof is algorithmic and quite involved. Furthermore, we also falsify a conjecture of Caragiannis et al. [CGH19] by showing an instance with three agents for which there is a partial EFX allocation (some items are not allocated) with higher Nash welfare than that of any complete EFX allocation.
Introduction
Discrete fair division of (scarce) resources is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings, where the goal is to partition a set M of m indivisible items among n agents in a fair manner. Each agent i has a valuation function v i : 2 M → R ≥0 that quantifies the amount of utility agent i derives from each subset of items. In case of additive valuation functions, v i (S) := j∈S v i ({j}), ∀S ⊆ M . Let X = X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n denote a partition of M into n bundles so that X i is allocated to agent i. Among various choices, envy-freeness is arguably the most compelling fairness concept, where no agent i envies another agent j's bundle, i.e., v i (X i ) ≥ v i (X j ), ∀i, j. However, envy-free allocation do not always exist, e.g., consider allocating a single valuable item among n ≥ 2 agents. This necessitated the study of relaxed notions of envy-freeness.
Envy-freeness up to one item (EF1): This relaxation was introduced by Budish [Bud11] , where X is said to be EF1 if no agent i envies another agent j after the removal of some item in j's bundle, i.e., v i (X i ) ≥ v i (X j \ g) for some g ∈ X j . So in a way it is okay for i to envy j, but the envy must disappear after the removal of some valuable item (according to agent i) from j's bundle. Note that there is no actual removal: This is simply a way agent i feels that his own bundle is not too bad in comparison with j's bundle. It is well known that an EF1 allocation always exists and it can be obtained in polynomial time using the famous envy-cycles procedure by Lipton et al. [LMMS04] . However, an EF1 allocation may be unsatisfactory: Intuitively, EF1 insists that envy disappears after the removal of the most valuable item according to the envier from the other's bundle -however, in many cases, the most valuable item might be the primary reason for very large envy to exist in the first place. Therefore, stronger notions of fairness are desirable in many circumstances.
Envy-freeness up to any item (EFX): This relaxation was introduced by Caragiannis et al. [CKM + 16] , where X is said to be EFX if no agent i envies another agent j after the removal of any item in j's bundle, i.e., v i (X i ) ≥ v i (X j \ g) for all g ∈ X j , ∀i, j. Unlike EF1, in an EFX allocation, the envy between any pair of agents disappears after the removal of the least valuable item. Note that every EFX allocation is an EF1 allocation, but not the other way around. Consider a simple example of two agents with additive valuations and three items {a, b, c} from [CKMS20] , where the valuation of individual items for each agent is as follows. Observe that c is twice as valuable than a or b for both agents. An allocation where one agent gets {a} and the other gets {b, c} is EF1 but not EFX. The only possible EFX allocation is where one agent gets {c} and the other gets {a, b}, which is clearly fairer than the former allocation. This example also shows how EFX helps ruling out some unsatisfactory EF1 allocations. Caragiannis et al. [CGH19] remarked that "Arguably, EFX is the best fairness analog of envy-freeness of indivisible items."
While an EF1 allocation is always guaranteed to exist, very little is known about the existence of EFX allocations. [CKM + 16] says that "Despite significant effort, we were not able to settle the question of whether an EFX allocation always exists (assuming all items must be allocated), and leave it as an enigmatic open question."
Plaut and Roughgarden [PR18] showed two scenarios for which EFX allocations are guaranteed to exist: (i) All agents have identical valuations (i.e., v 1 = v 2 = · · · = v n ), and (ii) Two agents (i.e., n = 2). Unfortunately, starting from three agents, even for the well studied class of additive valuations, it is open whether EFX allocations exist or not. [PR18] remarked that:
" The problem seems highly non-trivial even for three players with different additive valuations."
Furthermore, it was also suspected in [PR18] that EFX allocations may not exist in general settings:
"We suspect that at least for general valuations, there exist instances where no EFX allocation exists, and it may be easier to find a counterexample in that setting."
Contrary to this suspicion, we show that
Theorem. EFX allocations always exist for three agents with additive valuations! EFX with charity : Quite recently there have been studies [CGH19, CKMS20] that consider relaxations of EFX, called "EFX with charity". Here we look for partial EFX allocations, where all items are not allocated (some of them remain unallocated). In a trivial such allocation, no item is allocated to any agent. Clearly such an allocation is not interesting. Therefore, the goal is to determine allocations with some bound on the set of unallocated items (qualitative or quantitative). For instance, Chaudhury et al. [CKMS20] showed how to determine a partial EFX allocation X and a pool of unallocated items P such that no one envies the pool (i.e., v i (X i ) ≥ v i (P )) and P has less than n items (i.e., |P | < n) 1 . In case of additive valuations, [CGH19] shows the existence of a partial EFX allocation X = X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , where every agent gets at least half the value of his bundle in the allocation that maximizes the Nash welfare 2 (suggesting that unallocated items are not much valuable).
The Nash welfare of a fair allocation is often considered as a measure of efficiency of the allocation [CGH19] : Intuitively, it captures how much average welfare the allocation achieves while still remaining fair. The result of Caragiannis et al. [CGH19] imply that there are efficient partial EFX allocations (partial EFX allocations with a 2 factor approximation of the maximum possible Nash welfare). Indeed, it is a natural question to ask whether there are complete EFX allocations (all items are allocated) with good efficiency. To this end, Caragiannis et al. [CGH19] conjectured:
"In particular, we suspect that adding an item to an allocation problem (that provably has an EFX allocation) yields another problem that also has an EFX allocation with at least as high Nash welfare as the initial one." 3 If this conjecture is true, it implies the existence of an efficient complete EFX allocation. We show (in Section 5) that Theorem. The above conjecture is false.
In particular, we show an instance where there exists a partial EFX allocation with higher Nash welfare than the Nash welfare of any complete EFX allocation. This also highlights an inherent barrier in the current techniques to determining EFX allocations: Several of the existing algorithms for approximate EFX allocations ( [PR18] ) and EFX allocations with charity ([CKMS20]) start with a partial inefficient EFX allocation and make it more efficient iteratively by cleverly allocating some of the unallocated items and unallocating some of the allocated items. However, our instance in Section 5 shows that such approaches will not help if our goal is to determine a complete EFX allocation.
A large chunk of our work in this paper is dedicated to coming up with better tools to overcome this particular barrier. We consider the tools introduced in this paper to overcome this barrier as the most innovative technical contribution of our work. We also feel that these tools and the instances will be of assistance for resolving the major open problem of the existence of an EFX allocation for more than three agents and more general valuations (positively or negatively).
Our Contributions
Our major contribution in this paper is to show that an EFX allocation always exists when there are three agents with additive valuations. The proof is algorithmic. To discuss our techniques, we first highlight very briefly how we overcome two barriers in the current techniques.
Splitting bundles:
We first sketch the simple algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden [PR18] that determines an EFX allocation when all agents have identical valuation function, say v. Let us restrict our attention to the special case where there is no zero marginals, i.e., for any S ⊆ M and g / ∈ S we have v(S ∪ g) > v(S). Also, note that since agents have identical valuations, if v(X i ) < v(X j \ g) for two agents i and j for some g ∈ X j then we have v(X i min ) < v(X j \ g) where i min is the agent with the lowest valuation. The algorithm in [PR18] starts off with an arbitrary allocation (not necessarily EFX) and as long as there are agents i and j such that v(X i ) < v(X j \ g) for some g ∈ X j , the algorithm takes the item g away from j (j's new bundle is X j \ g) and adds it to i min 's bundle (i min 's new bundle is X i min ∪ g). Also, note that after re-allocation the only changed bundles are that of i min and j, and both of them have valuations still higher than i min 's initial valuation: v(X i min ∪ g) > v(X i min ) and v(X j \ g) > v(X i min ). Observe that such an operation increases the valuation of an agent with the lowest valuation. Thus, after finitely many applications of this re-allocation we must arrive at an EFX allocation. Note that this crucially uses the fact that the agents have identical valuations. In the general case, the valuation of agent j may drop significantly after removing g and j's current valuation may be even less than i min 's initial valuation. Therefore, it is important to understand how agents value item(s) that we move across the bundles. To this end, we carefully split every bundle into upper and lower half bundles (see (1) in Section 2). We systematically quantify relative valuations agents have for these upper and lower half bundles and in most cases, we are able to move these bundles from one agent to the other, and improve the valuation of some of the agents, while still guaranteeing EFX property. More elaborate discussions can be found in Sections 3 and 4.
A new potential function: After every swap of half-bundles, we need to show that there is progress. The typical method to show progress is to show improvement of the valuation vector on the Pareto front (see [CKMS20] and [PR18] ). However, there are limitations to this approach: In particular, we show an instance and a partial EFX allocation such that the valuation vector of any complete EFX allocation does not Pareto dominate the valuation vector of the existing partial EFX allocation. To overcome this barrier, we first pick an arbitrary agent a at the beginning and show that whenever we are unable to improve the valuation vector on the Pareto front, we can strictly increase a's valuation. In other words, valuation of a particular agent a never decreases throughout re-allocations and it improves after finitely many re-allocations, showing convergence. A more elaborate discussion on this technique is presented in Section 2.
Further Related Work
Fair division has received significant attention since the seminal work of Steinhaus [Ste48] in 1940s where he introduced the cake cutting problem among n > 2 agents. Perhaps the two most crucial aspects of fairness properties that can be guaranteed in case of divisible items are that of envy-freeness and proportionality. In a proportional allocation, each agent gets at least a 1/n share of all the items. In case of indivisible items, as mentioned earlier, none of these two notions can be guaranteed. While EF1 and EFX are fairness notions that relax envyfreeness, the most popular notion of fairness that relaxes proportionality for indivisible items is maximin share (MMS), which was introduced by Budish [Bud11] . While MMS allocations do not always exist [KPW18] , there has been extensive work in coming up with approximate MMS allocations [Bud11, BL16, AMNS17, BK17, KPW18, GHS + 18, GMT19, GT19] .
While there is extensive work on finding fair allocations, there has also been a lot of interest in guaranteeing efficient fair allocations. A standard notion of efficiency is Pareto-optimality 4 . Caragiannis et al. [CKM + 16] showed that any allocation that has the maximum Nash welfare is guaranteed to be Pareto-optimal (efficient) and EF1 (fair). Therefore, Nash welfare of an allocation is also considered as a measure of efficiency and fairness of the allocation. However, finding an allocation with the maximum Nash welfare is APX-hard [Lee17] , its approximation has received a lot of attention recently, e.g., [CG18, CDG + 17, AGSS17, GHM18, AMGV18, BKV18, CCG + 18, GKK20]. Barman et al. [BKV18] obtained a pseudopolynomial algorithm to find an allocation that is both EF1 and Pareto-optimal. There has also been work done in the context of guaranteeing approximate MMS with Pareto-optimality [GM19] or relaxations of EFX with high Nash welfare [CGH19] .
Applications: There are several real world scenarios where resources need to be divided fairly and efficiently, e.g., splitting rent among tenants, dividing inheritance property in a family, splitting taxi fares among riders, and many more. Examples of successful usage of fair division techniques include Spliddit (http://www.spliddit.org), a website dedicated to the theory and practice of fair division. Since its launch in 2014, it has had over several thousands of users [CKM + 16]. For more elaborate details on Spliddit, we refer to the reader to [GP14, PR18] . Course Allocate is another mechanism used at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania to fairly allocate 350 courses to 1700 MBA students [PR18, BCKO17] . Kurokowa et al. [KPS18] used leximin fairness to allocate unused classrooms in the public schools to charter schools in California. The best part of the allocations determined in all these applications are that they not only seem fair on most instances, but are guaranteed to satisfy some nice mathematical fairness properties.
Preliminaries and Technical Overview
We first introduce some basic notation. Any instance I is a triple [3], M, V , where we have three agents 1,2 and 3, a set M of m indivisible items (or goods) and a set of valuation functions
captures the utility agent i has for all the different subsets of goods that can be allocated. Also the valuation functions are additive: v i (S) = g∈S v i ({g}) and normalized : v i (∅) = 0. For ease of notation we write v i (g) for v i ({g}). Also we write S ≥ i T for v i (S) ≥ v i (T ), and use the symbols < i , > i , and ≤ i in their appropriate meanings. Given an allocation X = X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n we say that i strongly envies a bundle S ⊆ M if X i < i S \ g for some g ∈ S and we say i weakly envies S if X i < i S but X i ≥ i S \ g for all g ∈ S.
Non-degenerate instances: We call an instance I = [3], M, V non-degenerate if and only if no agent values two different sets equally, i.e., ∀i ∈ [3] we have v i (S) = v i (T ) for all S = T . We first show that it suffices to deal with non-degenerate instances. Let M = {g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g m }.
We perturb any instance I to
• I(ε) is a non-degenerate instance. Furthermore, if X = X 1 , X 2 , X 3 is an EFX allocation for I(ε) then X is also an EFX allocation for I.
Proof. For the first statement of the lemma, observe that
For the second statement of the lemma, consider any two sets S, T ⊆ M such that S = T . Now, for any
For the final claim, let us assume that X is not an EFX allocation in I. Then, there exists i, j and g ∈ X j such that v i (X j \ g) > v i (X i ). In that case, we have v i (X j \ g) > v i (X i ) by the first statement of the lemma, implying that X is not an EFX allocation in I(ε) as well, which is a contradiction.
Hereafter we only deal with non-degenerate instances. In non-degenerate instances, all goods have positive value for all agents.
Overall approach: An allocation X Pareto dominates an allocation X, if v i (X i ) ≤ v i (X i ) for all i with strict inequality for at least one i. The existing algorithms for "EFX with charity" [CKMS20] or "approximate EFX allocations" [PR18] construct a sequence of EFX allocations in which each allocation Pareto dominates its predecessor. We need a more flexible approach as we exhibit in Section 5 a partial EFX allocation that is not Pareto dominated by any complete EFX allocation. So starting from this allocation there is no sequence of EFX allocation leading to a complete allocation and Pareto improving the allocation in each step.
We name the agents a, b and c arbitrarily and consider the lexicographic ordering of the triples
We construct a sequence of allocations in which each allocation dominates its predecessor. Of course, if X Pareto dominates X then it also dominates X. So we can use all the update rules in [CKMS20] . Now our goal would be to iteratively construct EFX allocations such that each EFX allocation dominates its predecessor.
Most envious agent:
We use the notion of most envious agent introduced in [CKMS20]. Consider an allocation X, a set S ⊆ M that is envied by at least one agent. For an agent i such that S > i X i , we "quantify the envy" that agent i has for S by κ X (i, S), where κ X (i, S) is the size of a smallest subset of S that i still envies, i.e., κ X (i, S) is the smallest cardinality of a subset S of S such that S > i X i . Thus, the smaller the value of κ X (i, S), we say the greater is the envy for agent i for the set S. So let κ X (S) = min i∈[3] κ X (i, S). Naturally, we define the set of the most envious agents A X (S) for a set S as the set of agents with smallest values of κ X (i, S), i.e.,
The following easy observation about the most envious agents of specific kind of bundles will be useful.
Observation 2. Given any allocation X and an unallocated good g. For any i ∈ [3], A X (X i ∪g) is non-empty.
Proof. It suffices to prove that there exists an agent who values X i ∪ g strictly over its own bundle in allocation X. To this end, we observe that X i ∪ g > i X i as we are dealing with non-degenerate instances.
Champions and Champion-Graph M X : Let X be the partial EFX allocation at any stage in our algorithm and let g be an unallocated good. We say that i champions j if i is a most envious agent for X j ∪ g, i.e., i ∈ A X (X j ∪ g). By Observation 2 we have that the set of champions of any agent is never empty. We define the champion graph M X where the vertices correspond to the agents and the directed edge (i, j) ∈ M X iff i champions j. Now we make a small observation about M X .
Observation 3. The champion graph M X is cyclic.
Proof. Every vertex in M X has at least one incoming edge as the set of champions of an agent is never empty. Thus M X is cyclic.
If i champions j, we define G ij as a largest cardinality subset of
Since the valuations are additive, note that such a subset can be identified efficiently as the set K of the k least valuable goods for i in X j ∪ g such that (X j ∪ g) \ K > i X i and k is maximum. Now we make some small observations. Observation 4. Assume i champions j.
Since k values any subset of X j ∪ g of size less than κ X (k,
We next mention two cases, where it was shown in earlier papers how to obtain a Pareto dominating EFX allocation from an existing EFX allocation. For an allocation X, we define the envy-graph E X where the vertices correspond to agents and there is an edge from i to j if i envies j, i.e., X j > i X i . We can always assume without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) that E X is acyclic.
Observation 6 ([CKMS20]). Consider an EFX allocation X. Let s be any agent and let g be an unallocated good. If i champions s and i is reachable from s in E X , then there is an EFX allocation Y Pareto dominating X. Additionally, agent s is strictly better off in Y , i.e., Y s > s X s .
Proof. We have that i is reachable from s in E X . Let t 1 → t 2 → · · · → t k be the path from t 1 = s to t k = i in E X . We determine a new allocation Y as follows:
for all other Note that every agent along the path has strictly improved his valuation: Agents t 1 to t k−1 got bundles they envied in E X and agent i championed s and got X s \ G is ∪ g, which is more valuable to i than X i (by definition of G is ). Also, every other agent retained their previous bundles and thus their valuations are not lower than before. Thus φ(Y ) lex φ(X) and also Y s > s X s (s was an agent along the path). It only remains to argue that Y is EFX. To this end consider any 2 agents j and j . We wish to show that j does not strongly envy j in Y .
Case j = i: Note that Y j = X for some ∈ [3] (it either received a bundle of another agent when we shifted the bundles along the path or it retained its previous bundle). Also note
Thus j does not strongly envy i.
Observation 6 implies that if the envy-graph E X has a single source or if any agent champions himself, and there is some unallocated good, then there is a strictly Pareto dominating EFX allocation.
Corollary 7. Let X be an EFX allocation and g be an unallocated good. If E X has a single source s or M X has a 1-cycle involving agent s, then there is an EFX allocation Y Pareto dominating X and Y s > s X s .
Proof. If E X has a single source s, the champion of s (which always exist, by Observation 2) is reachable from s. If M X has a 1-cycle involving agent s then again the champion of s (which is s itself) is reachable from s. In both cases, since the champion of s is reachable from s in the envy graph E X , there is a Pareto dominating allocation Y such that Y s > s X s by Observation 6.
Thus in the upcoming sections we only discuss the cases where the envy-graph has more than one source and there are no self-champions.
We start with some simple but crucial observations.
Observation 8. If i champions j and
Observation 8 tells us that if i champions j and i does not envy j, then G ij ⊆ X j and therefore we can split the bundle of agent j into two parts G ij and X j \ G ij . We refer G ij as the lower-half bundle of j and X j \ G ij as the upper-half bundle of j, and visualize the bundle of agent j as
if i champions j and i does not envy j.
(1)
We collect some more facts about the values of lower and upper halves.
Observation 9. If i champions j and j does not self-champion, then we have G ij = ∅ and G ij ≥ j g.
Proof. Since j does not self-champion, by Observation 4 (part 2) we have that (
In the upcoming sections we show how to derive a dominating EFX allocation from an existing EFX allocations. Corollary 7 already deals with the cases that E X has a single source or M X has a 1-cycle. We proceed under the following general assumptions: E X is cycle-free and has at least two sources and there is no 1-cycle in M X . We next distinguish cases according to the number of sources of E X .
Existence of EFX: Three sources in E X
If E X has three sources, the allocation X is envy-free, i.e., X i ≥ i X j for all i and j. We distinguish whether M X contains a 2-cycle or not.
2-cycle in M X
Assume without loss of generality that 2 champions 1 and 1 champions 2. Since X 1 ≥ 1 X 2 and X 2 ≥ 2 X 1 , the bundles X 1 and X 2 decompose according to (1). Since neither 1 nor 2 self-champion (as M X has no 1-cycle), by Observation 10, we have X 2 \ G 12 > 1 X 1 \ G 21 and X 1 \ G 21 > 2 X 1 \ G 12 . We swap the upper-halves of X 1 and X 2 to obtain
.
Note that agent 3 has the same valuation as before while 1 and 2 are strictly better off. If X is EFX we are done. So assume otherwise. We first determine the potential strong envy edges.
• From 1 : We replaced the more valuable (according to 1) X 2 \ G 12 in X 2 with the less valuable X 1 \ G 21 and left X 3 unchanged. Thus 1 is strictly better off and according to him, the valuations of the bundles of 2 and 3 in X is at most the valuation of their bundles in X. As 1 did not envy 2 and 3 before in X, 1 does not envy 2 and 3 in X .
• From 2 : A symmetrical argument shows 2 does not envy 1 and 3.
• From 3 : For agent 3, the sum of the valuations of agents 1 and 2 has not changed by the swap and 3 envied neither 1 nor 2 before the swap. Thus 3 envies at most one of the agents 1 and 2 after the swap. Assume w.l.o.g. he envies agent 2. We then replace the lower-half bundle of agent 2 (G 12 ) with g to obtain
In X , agent 2 is still strictly better off than in X since by definition of G 21 we have X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g > 2 X 2 . Thus X Pareto dominates X. We still need to show that X is EFX. To this end, observe that since we have not changed the bundles of agents 1 and 3, there is no strong envy between them. So we only need to exclude strong envy edges towards agent 2 or from agent 2.
-Nobody strongly envies agent 2 : Note that 2 championed 1. Thus, (
(part 1). Since both 1 and 3 are not worse off than before, they do not strongly envy 2.
-Agent 2 does not envy anyone: We have that X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g > 2 X 2 . Also according to 2, the valuation of the current bundles of 1 and 3 is at most their previous one and 2 did not envy them before (when he had X 2 ). Thus 2 does not envy 1 and 3.
We have thus shown that X is EFX and Pareto dominates X. Actually, the strategy described above handles a more general situation. It yields a Pareto dominating EFX allocation as long as 3 envies neither 1 nor 2 initially, even if 1 and 2 envied 3 (not strongly envied) initially. We formalize the statement in the following remark.
Remark 11. Let X be an EFX allocation and g be an unallocated good. If M X has a 2-cycle, say involving agents 1 and 2 and agent 3 envies neither 1 nor 2, then there exists an EFX allocation Y Pareto dominating X.
Remark 11 will be helpful when we deal with certain instances where E X has two sources later in Section 4.
No 2-cycle in M X
We now consider the case when M X has no two cycle. Since M X is cyclic and we neither have a 1-cycle nor a 2-cycle, we must have a 3-cycle. Let us assume w.l.o.g. that agent i + 1 is the unique champion of agent i (indices are modulo 3, so i + 1 corresponds to (i mod 3) + 1). Since, in addition, i + 1 does not envy i, all three bundles decompose according to (1) and the current allocation can be written as
(2)
(3) .
Let us collect what we know for agent 1's valuation for the upper-half bundles: 1 uniquely champions 3, while 2 and 3 uniquely champion 1 and 2 respectively. Also, the current allocation is envy-free. Thus X i ≥ X j for all i, j ∈ [3]. By Observation 10 we know that X 3 \ G 13 > 1 max 1 (X 1 \ G 21 , X 2 \ G 32 ) 5 (X 3 \ G 13 is 1's favorite upper-half bundle). Now, let us collect what we know for agent 1's valuation for the lower-half bundles: 1 champions 3 and does not envy 3's bundle. Thus by Observation 8, G 13 < 1 g and g ∈ G 13 . Also, 1 does not champion itself and 3 champions 1. Thus, by Observation 9, g ≤ 1 G 21 . We can make similar statements about agents 2 and 3. Since g ∈ G 21 and our instance is assumed to be non-degenerate, we even have g < 1 G 21 . Tables 1 and 2 summarize this information.
Agent 1 We first move to an allocation where everyone gets its favorite upper-half bundle (we achieve this by just performing a cyclic shift of the upper-half bundles). Thus the new allocation is
Clearly every agent is strictly better off and thus X Pareto dominates X. If X is EFX, we are done. So we assume otherwise. What envy edges can there be? We first observe that no agent will envy the agent from whom it took its upper-half during the cyclic-shift.
Observation 12. Agent i + 1 does not envy agent i for all i ∈ [3] (indices are modulo 3).
Proof. We just show the proof for i = 1 and the other cases follow symmetrically. Note that 2 values its current upper-half more than 1's upper-half (it has its favorite upper-half): X 1 \G 21 > 2 X 3 \ G 13 . Similarly 2's also values its lower-half more than 1's lower-half: G 32 ≥ 2 g > 2 G 21 . Therefore 2 values its entire bundle more than 1's bundle and hence does not envy 1.
Therefore, the only envy-edges and hence strong envy edges can be from agent i to agent i + 1 as shown in the following figure. 6 1 2 3
We now distinguish two cases depending on the number of such strong envy-edges.
Three strong envy edges: In this case the envy-graph is a 3-cycle. We perform a cyclic shift of the bundles and obtain an EFX allocation Pareto dominating the initial allocation X.
At most two strong envy edges: Note that in this case, there is a strong envy edge from at least one agent i ∈ [3] to i + 1 and there is no strong envy edge from at least one agent j ∈ [3] to j + 1. Let us assume without loss of generality that there is a strong envy edge from 1 to 2 , there may or may not be a strong envy edge from 2 to 3 and there is no strong envy edge from 3 to 1. Note that 1 is strictly better off in X than in X. The existence of envy from 1 and 2, despite this improvement allows us to say more about the ordering of the upper-half and the lower-half bundles.
Observation 13. If 1 envies 2 in X , X 1 \ G 21 > 1 X 2 \ G 32 and G 32 > 1 G 21 .
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Assume otherwise i.e.
≤ 1 X 1 (since 1 did not envy 2 before)
(since 1 is better off than before)
implying that 1 does not envy 2, a contradiction. If G 32 ≤ 1 G 21 , then
again implying that 1 does not envy 2, a contradiction.
So we now have
We replace the lower-half of 2 (G 32 ) by g to obtain
Note that agents 1 and 3 are still strictly better off (as we have not changed their bundles after the cyclic shift of the upper-half bundles) as in X. Agent 2 was the champion for 1, thus X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g > 2 X 2 and thus agent 2 is also strictly better off. Thus X Pareto dominates X. If there are no strong envy edges, we are done. So assume otherwise. We first note that the only possible strong envy edge is from 2 to 3:
• Agent 1 does not envy anyone: 1 did not envy 3 in X and the bundles of 1 and 3 are the same in X and X . 1 does not envy 2 anymore as he prefers his own upper-half and lower-half to 2's upper-half and lower-half respectively, namely X 3 \G 13 > 1 X 1 \G 21 (from Table 1 ) and G 21 ≥ 1 g (from Table 2 ).
• Agent 3 does not envy anyone: We use a similar argument. 3 did not envy 1 in X and the bundles of 1 and 3 are the same in X and X . 3 does not envy 2 as well as he prefers his own upper-half and lower-half to 2's upper-half and lower-half respectively, namely X 2 \ G 32 > 3 X 1 \ G 21 (from Table 1 ) and G 13 ≥ 3 g (from Table 2 ).
• Agent 2 does not envy 1: Note that agent 2 has his favorite upper half and values it more than 1's upper-half: X 1 \ G 21 > 2 X 3 \ G 13 (from Table 1 ) and 2 also values his lower half more than 1's lower half: g > 2 G 21 (from Table 2) .
Therefore the only possible strong envy edge is from 2 to 3 as shown below.
1 2 3
Similar to Observation 13 we can now infer more about 2's ordering for the bundles.
Observation 14. If 2 strongly envies 3 in X , we have X 2 \ G 32 > 2 X 3 \ G 13 and G 13 > 2 G 32 .
Proof. As in Observation 13, we argue by contradiction. Assume otherwise i.e.
≤ 2 X 2 (since 2 did not envy 3 before)
< 2 X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g (as 2 is better off than before)
implying that 2 does not envy 3, a contradiction. If G 13 ≤ 2 G 32 , then
again implying that 2 does not envy 3, a contradiction.
We are ready to construct the final allocation. To this end, consider the bundle X 1 \ G 21 ∪ G 13 . Note that, Table 2) > 2 X 2 (as 2 championed 1)
Let Z be a smallest cardinality subset of X 1 \ G 21 ∪ G 13 such that Z > 2 X 2 . Since g ∈ X 1 and g ∈ G 13 , g ∈ Z. We now give two allocations depending on how much 3 values Z.
Case, Z > 3 X 3 : Consider
Since 1 was the champion of 3, we have X 3 \ G 13 ∪ g > 1 X 1 . Thus 1 and 3 are strictly better off and 2 has the same bundle as in X. Therefore X Pareto dominates X. We still need to show that X is EFX.
• Nobody strongly envies agent 1 : Since 1 is the champion of 3, we have that (X 3 \G 13 ∪ g) \ h < 2 X 2 and (X 3 \ G 13 ∪ g) \ h < 3 X 3 for all h ∈ X 3 \ G 13 ∪ g by Observation 4 (part 1). As both 2 and 3 are not worse off than in X, neither of them strongly envies X 3 \ G 13 ∪ g.
• Nobody envies agent 2 : Both 1 and 3 are strictly better off than in X and they did not envy X 2 in X. Thus they do not envy X 2 now.
• Nobody strongly envies agent 3 : We first show that 1 does not envy X 1 \ G 21 ∪ G 13 . This follows from the observation that 1 prefers his own upper-half to X 1 \ G 21 and lower-half to G 13 : X 3 \ G 13 > 1 X 1 \ G 21 (from Table 1 ) and g > 1 G 13 (from Table 2 ). Thus X 3 \ G 13 ∪ g > 1 X 1 \ G 21 ∪ G 13 . Therefore 1 does not envy Z either as Z ⊆ X 1 \ G 21 ∪ G 13 . Agent 2 does not strongly envy Z since Z is a smallest cardinality subset of X 1 \ G 21 ∪ G 13 that 2 values more than X 2 . Thus Z \ h ≤ 2 X 2 for all h ∈ Z.
We first show that 1 is strictly better off in X than in X. Observe that Table 2) > 1 X 1 (as 1 championed 3) 2 is better off as Z > 2 X 2 by definition of Z. 3 is also better off than in X as it championed 2 and thus X 2 \G 32 ∪g > 3 X 3 . Thus all agents are strictly better off and hence X Pareto dominates X. We next show that X is EFX.
• Nobody envies agent 1 : Agent 2 does not envy 1 since
Agent 3 does not envy 1 either since her prefers his current upper half to and lower half to 1's upper half and lower half respectively, namely X 2 \ G 32 > 3 X 3 \ G 13 (from Table 1 ) and g > 3 G 32 (from Table 2 ).
• Nobody envies agent 2 : Observe that 1 does not envy X 1 \G 21 ∪G 13 since 1 is strictly better off, G 21 ≥ 1 g > 1 G 13 from Table 2 , and G 32 > 1 G 21 by Observation 13. Thus
Agent 3 does not envy 2 since X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g > 3 X 3 (see above) and X 3 ≥ 3 Z.
• Nobody strongly envies agent 3 : Since 3 is the champion of 2, we have (X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g) \ h < 2 X 2 and (X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g) \ h < 1 X 1 for all h ∈ X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g by Observation 4 (part 1). As both 1 and 2 are strictly better off than in X, neither of them strongly envies X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g.
We have thus shown that given an allocation X such that E X has three sources and M X has a 3-cycle, there exists an EFX allocation Y Pareto dominating X. We summarize our main result for this section:
Lemma 15. Let X be a partial EFX allocation and g be an unallocated good. If E X has three sources, then there is an EFX allocation Y Pareto dominating X. 4 Existence of EFX: Two sources in E X Let us assume that 1 and 2 are the sources. Let (1, 3) ∈ E X . We have two configurations for E X now, depending on whether (2, 3) ∈ E X or not. If (2, 3) ∈ E X , it is relatively straightforward to determine a Pareto dominating EFX allocation. Agent 3 is a reachable from both 1 and 2 in E X and hence, if 3 champions either 1 or 2, we have a Pareto dominating EFX allocation by Observation 6. If 3 champions neither 1 nor 2, 1 and 2 must be champions of each other (Recall that no agent self-champions). Also note that 3 envies neither 1 nor 2. Therefore by Remark 11 we have a Pareto dominating EFX allocation.
Hereafter we assume that (2, 3) / ∈ E X . The envy-graph is now as shown in Figure 1 . Next, we discuss the possible configurations of the champion-graph M X . We show that most configurations are easily handled. If 3 champions 1, then by Observation 6 there is a Pareto dominating EFX allocation. If 3 does not champion 1 and since 1 does not self-champion, agent 2 champions 1. If now 1 champions 2, we have a 2-cycle in M X involving 1 and 2, and 3 envies neither of them. Therefore by Remark 11 there is a Pareto dominating EFX allocation. Thus we may assume that 1 does not champion 2. Since 2 does not self-champion, agent 3 champions 2. Now there are only three possible configurations for M X , depending on who champions 3 (only 1, only 2, both 1 and 2 as 3 does not self-champion) (see Figure 2) .
We now show how to deal with these configurations of M X . In Section 3, we showed how to move from the current allocation X to an allocation that Pareto dominates X. In Section 5, we show that this is impossible in this particular configuration of E X and M X . More specifically, we exhibit an EFX allocation X that is not Pareto dominated by any complete EFX allocation. We also show that there is no complete EFX allocation with higher Nash welfare than X, thereby falsifying the conjecture of Caragiannis et al. [CGH19] .
Recall that our potential φ(X) = (v a (X a ), v b (X b ), v c (X c )). We move to an allocation in which agent a is strictly better off. We distinguish cases according to a = 1, a = 2, and a = 3.
Also, recall that we are in the case where 2 champions 1 and 2 did not envy 1. Similarly 3 champions 2 and 3 did not envy 2. Therefore by Observation 8 we have that g / ∈ G 21 and g / ∈ G 32 and hence the bundles X 1 and X 2 decompose according to (1). Also since 2 champions 1 and 1 did not self champion, by Observation 9 we have that G 21 = ∅. A similar argument also shows that G 32 = ∅.
Agent a is agent 1 or 3
We start from the allocation
Our goal is to determine an EFX allocation where 1 and 3 are strictly better off (2 may be worse off). To this end we consider
In X every agent is better off than in X: 1 is better off as X 3 > 1 X 1 (1 envied 3 in E X ). We now show that 2 is better off: 2 championed 1 and 3 championed 2. Also, 2 did not self champion, 2 did not envy 1 and 3 did not envy 2 . Therefore by Observation 10 (setting i = k = 2, j = 1,
Thus 2 is also better off. Agent 3 is better off as 3 championed 2 and by definition of G 32 we have X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g > 3 X 3 . Thus X Pareto dominates X. If X is EFX, we are done. So assume otherwise. We show that the only possible strong envy edge will be from 1 to 2.
• Nobody envies 1 : Note that 1 has X 3 and neither 2 nor 3 envied X 3 earlier (3 had X 3 and 2 did not envy 3). Since both 2 and 3 are better off than before, they do not envy 1.
• Nobody strongly envies 3 : 3 championed 2. Therefore by Observation 4 (part 1) we have that (X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g) \ h ≤ 2 X 2 and (X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g) \ h ≤ 1 X 1 for all h ∈ X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g. Since both 1 and 2 are better off than in X, they do not strongly envy 3.
• 3 does not envy 2 : 3 championed 2 and 3 did not envy 2 earlier. Therefore by Observation 8 we have that G 32 < 3 g. Therefore X 1 \ G 21 ∪ G 32 < 3 X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g. Since 2 championed 1 and 3 did not, by Observation 4 (part 2) we have (X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g) ≤ 3 X 3 . Since 3 is better off than in X, 3 does not envy 2.
Thus the only strong envy edge is from 1 to 2. The current state of the envy-graph is depicted below:
Let Z be a smallest cardinality subset of X 1 \ G 21 ∪ G 32 that 2 values more than max 2 (X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g, X 3 ), where max 2 (X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g, X 3 ) is defined as the more valuable bundle out of X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g and X 3 according to 2; note that max 2 (X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g, X 3 ) ≤ 2 X 1 \ G 21 ∪ G 32 since 2 does not envy either 1 or 3 in X . Since the instance is non-degenerate, the inequality is strict and hence Z exists. We now consider two allocations depending on 1's value for Z.
Case, Z ≤ 1 X 3 : We replace 2's current bundle with Z and obtain X = X 3
Z
Agents 1 and 3 have the same bundles as in X and hence are strictly better of than in X. Thus X dominates X, as a = 1 or a = 3 and we improve a strictly. We next show that X is EFX. Since the only bundle we have changed is that of 2, and there were no strong envy edges between 1 and 3 earlier, it suffices to show that there are no strong envy edges to and from 2.
• Nobody envies 2 : 3 did not envy the set X 1 \ G 21 ∪ G 32 . Thus it does not envy Z either as Z ⊆ X 1 \G 21 ∪G 32 . 1 does not envy Z as we are in the case where Z ≤ 1 X 3 .
• 2 does not envy anyone: This follows from the definition of Z itself as Z > 2 max 2 (X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g, X 3 ).
Case, Z > 1 X 3 : In this case, we consider
Agent 1 is still strictly better off than in X as we are in the case Z > 1 X 3 > 1 X 1 and the third agent is not worse off than before as both X 3 and X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g are at least as valuable to him as his previous bundle (X 3 ). We first show that X is EFX.
• 1 does not envy anyone: We are in the case where Z > 1 X 3 and 1 did not envy X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g when he had X 3 itself (and now 1 is better off than X 3 ). Thus, 1 does not envy anyone.
• 2 does not strongly envy anyone: Since 2 chooses the better bundle out of X 3 and X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g, 2 does not envy 3. Agent 2 does not strongly envy 1 since by definition of Z, we have Z \ h ≤ 2 max 2 (X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g, X 3 ) for all h ∈ Z. However note that 2 envies 1. Thus 2 does not envy 3 and does not strongly envy 1 (but envies 1).
• 3 does not strongly envy anyone: 3 did not envy the set X 1 \ G 21 ∪ G 32 7 and X 3 ≤ X 3 as we argued above. Thus 3 will not envy Z either as Z ⊆ X 1 \ G 21 ∪ G 32 . We next show that 3 does not strongly envy 2. Observe that X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g > 3 X 3 . Therefore if min 2 (X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g, X 3 ) = X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g, we are done. So assume min 2 (X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g, X 3 ) = X 3 . Since 3 championed 2 and from Observation 4 (part 1) we have that (X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g) \ h ≤ 3 X 3 for all h ∈ X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g; thus 3 does not strongly envy 2. Now if a = 1, we are done, as X is EFX and agent 1 strictly improved. So assume a = 3. If min 2 (X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g, X 3 ) = X 2 \ G 32 ∪ g, then agent 3 is strictly better off and we are done. This leaves the case that agent 3 gets X 3 and hence X = Z
The envy graph E X with respect to allocation X is a path: 1 does not envy anyone, 2 envies 1 (not strongly) and does not envy 3 and 3 envies 2. Also note that we have some unallocated goods, e.g., the goods in G 21 . Recall that we argued G 21 = ∅ in the paragraph just before Section 4.1. Consider any good g ∈ G 21 . Since 3 is the only source in E X , by Corollary 7, there is an EFX allocation X Pareto dominating X , where X 3 > 3 X 3 = X 3 . Thus we have an EFX allocation X that dominates X (as agent 3 is strictly better off and a = 3).
Agent a is agent 2
Recall that we argued just before the beginning of Section 4.1 that g / ∈ G 21 and g / ∈ G 32 . Thus the current EFX allocation X is
Our aim is to determine an EFX allocation, where agent 2 has a bundle more valuable than X 2 . First observe that X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g is such a bundle. As 2 championed 1 we have X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g > 2 X 2 by the definition of G 21 . We also observe that both agents 1 and 3 value X 3 as least as much as X 2 and X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g.
Proof. We argue ≥ i ; strict inequality then follows from non-degeneracy. Nobody envies 2 in X. Thus X 2 ≤ 3 X 3 and X 2 ≤ 1 X 1 < 1 X 3 (the last inequality holds as 1 envies 3 in X).
2 is the unique champion of 1 in X (both 1 and 3 do not champion 1). Therefore by Observation 4 (part 2), we have X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g ≤ 3 X 3 and X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g ≤ 1 X 1 < 1 X 3 (the last inequality holds as 1 envies 3 in X).
For i ∈ {1, 3} let κ i be the size of a smallest subset Z i of X 3 such that Z i > i max i (X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g, X 2 ). We use the relative size of κ 1 and κ 3 to differentiate between agents 1 and 3. We use w (winner) to denote the agent with the smaller value of κ i , i.e., w = 1 if κ 1 ≤ κ 3 and w = 3 if κ 1 > κ 3 . We use (looser) for the other agent. Consider
In X the only possible strong envy edge is from to w. By Observation 16, w does not envy either or 2. Note that 2 championed 1. Therefore X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g > 2 X 2 , but by Observation 4 (part 1), we have (X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g) \ h ≤ 2 X 2 for all h ∈ X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g. Thus 2 gets a bundle worth at least X 2 and does not strongly envy . 2 also does not envy w (as it did not envy X 3 when it had X 2 ). does not envy 2 as it chooses the better bundle out of X 2 and X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g. Thus the only possible strong envy edge is from to w. How we proceed, depends on whether strongly envies w or not.
does not strongly envy w: Then X is EFX. If min (X 2 , (X 1 \ G 21 ) ∪ g) = (X 1 \ G 21 ) ∪ g, we are done as X dominates X (2 is strictly better off and a = 2). So assume otherwise. Then
By Observation 16, envies w. Since 2 only envies , only envies w, and w envies no-one, the envy graph E X is a path with source 2.
2 w Also note that there are unallocated goods, the goods in G 21 (we argued just before the beginning of Section 4.1 that G 21 = ∅). Therefore by Corollary 7, there is an EFX allocation X , where 2 is strictly better off. Thus X dominates X as 2 is strictly better off and a = 2. strongly envies w: We keep removing the least valuable good according to w from w's bundle, until does not strongly envy w anymore. Let Z be the bundle obtained in this way. Consider
Claim 17. w does not envy 2 and .
Proof. Recall that κ w is the smallest cardinality of a subset of X 3 that w still values more than max w (X 2 , (X 1 \ G 21 ) ∪ g); κ w was defined just after Observation 16. Such a set can be obtained by removing w's least valuable |X 3 | − κ w goods from X 3 . Observe that Z is obtained by removing |X 3 | − |Z| of w's least valuable goods from X 3 . If |Z| ≥ κ w , w will envy neither 2 nor . If |Z| < κ w ≤ κ (recall that κ w ≤ κ ), let h be the last good removed. Then strongly envies Z ∪ h (otherwise we would not have removed h), meaning that there exists an
. Thus there is a subset of X 3 of size |(Z ∪ h) \ h | < κ w + 1 − 1 = κ w that values more than max (X 2 , (X 1 \ G 21 ) ∪ g), a contradiction to κ w ≤ κ .
The allocation X is EFX: w does not envy 2 and , does not strongly envy w, does not envy 2, and 2 envies neither nor w. If min (X 2 , (X 1 \ G 21 ) ∪ g) is X 1 \ G 21 ∪ g, then we are done as X will dominate X (2 is strictly better off and a = 2). So assume otherwise. Then
In X , w envies nobody (by Claim 17), 2 envies , and may or may not envy w. We distinguish cases according to whether envies w or not.
Case, does not envy w: Then, the current envy graph has two sources, namely w and 2, and one envy-edge from 2 to .
w
There are at least two unallocated goods, the goods in G 21 (we argued just before the beginning of Section 4.1 that G 21 = ∅) and the goods in X 3 \ Z (note that this set is not empty; we definitely have removed at least one good from X 3 as strongly envied it in X ). Now consider the allocation X and some g ∈ G 21 . If now, the champion of 2 is 2 itself or (definition of champion based on allocation X and the unallocated good g ), by Observation 6 there is an EFX allocation Y where the source, namely 2, is strictly better off and hence Y will dominate X. So assume that the champion of 2 is w, i.e., w ∈ A X (X 2 ∪ g ). Now we pick another unallocated good g ∈ X 3 \ Z. We observe that is the champion of w (definition of champion based on allocation X and the unallocated good g ) i.e. ∈ A X (X w ∪ g ).
Observation 18. For any good g ∈ X 3 \ Z we have A X (X w ∪ g ) = { }.
Proof. We have X w = Z. First we show that 2 / ∈ A X (Z ∪ g ). Note that Z ∪ g ⊆ X 3 . Since X 2 ≥ 2 X 3 (as 2 did not envy 3 in X), 2 will not envy Z∪g as well. By construction of Z, g is w's least valuable good in Z∪g . Thus removal of any good from Z∪g will result in a bundle whose value for w is no more than the value of Z for w. Therefore κ X (w, Z∪g ) = |Z ∪ g | 8 . Note that strongly envies Z ∪ g . Therefore there exists h ∈ Z ∪ g such that
Thus w does not self-champion and hence A X (Z ∪ g ) = { }.
Consider
or equivalently
Note that every agent is strictly better off than in X . w championed 2 and by definition of G w2 we have (X 2 ∪ g ) \ G w2 > w X w . Similarly, championed w and by definition of G w we have (X w ∪ g ) \ G w > X . 2 is better off as 2 envied in X i.e. X 2 < 2 X . Now we have an allocation X where agent 2 is strictly better off than it was in X. Thus X dominates X (as a =2). It suffices to show that X is EFX now. To this end, observe that,
• Nobody strongly envies w: w championed 2. Thus by Observation 4 (part 1) we have that ((
Since both 2 and are better off than before (in X ), they do not strongly envy w. g 1 g 2 g 3 g 4 g 5 g 6 g 7 a 1 8 2 12 2 0 17 1 a 2 5 0 9 4 10 0 3 a 3 0 0 0 0 9 10 2 Table 3 : An instance where no complete EFX allocation dominates the EFX allocation X for the first six goods defined in the text. The valuations are assumed to be additive and the entry in row i and column j is the value of good j for agent i.
• Nobody strongly envies : A very similar argument can be used here. championed 2. Thus by Observation 4 (part 1) we have that ((
Since both 2 and w are better off than before (than they were in X ), they do not strongly envy w.
• Nobody strongly envies 2: Both w and did not envy X ( had X and w did not envy ) when they had X w and X itself. Both w and are strictly better off than they were in X . Therefore they do not envy 2 as well.
We conclude that there is an EFX allocation dominating X also in the case a = 2. We summarize our main result for this section as follows,
Lemma 19. Let X be a partial EFX allocation and g be an unallocated good. Also, E X has two sources. Then there is an EFX allocation Y dominating X. Proof. We start off with an empty allocation (X i = ∅ for all i ∈ [3]), which is trivially EFX. As long as X is not a complete EFX allocation, there is an allocation Y that dominates X: If E X has a single source or M X has a 1-cycle, there is a dominating EFX allocation Y by Corollary 7. Lemmas 15 and 19 establish the existence of Y , when E X has multiple sources and M X does not have a 1-cycle. Since φ is bounded from above, the process must stop. When it stops, we have arrived at a complete EFX allocation.
Barriers in Current Techniques
In this section we highlight some barriers to the current techniques to compute EFX allocations. We give an instance with three agents and seven goods such there is a partial EFX allocation for six of the goods that is not Pareto dominated by any complete EFX allocation for the full set of goods. We also generalize this example and give an instance with a partial EFX alocation whose Nash welfare is larger than the Nash welfare of any complete EFX allocation. These examples make it unlikely that there is an iterative algorithm towards a complete EFX allocation that improves the current EFX allocation in each iteration either in the sense of Pareto domination or in the sense of Nash welfare (like the algorithms in [PR18] amd [CKMS20] ). The second example also falsifies the EFX-monotonicity conjecture (see Conjecture 23) by Caragiannis et al. [CGH19] .
Theorem 21. For the instance given in Table 3 , the partial allocation X = X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , where
is an EFX allocation of the first six goods. No complete EFX allocation Pareto dominates X.
Proof. Note that v 1 (X 1 ) = 16, v 2 (X 2 ) = 15, and v 3 (X 3 ) = 10. We will show that there is no complete allocation X with v 1 (X 1 ) ≥ 16, v 2 (X 2 ) ≥ 15 and v 3 (X 3 ) ≥ 10. To this end, we systematically consider potential bundles X 1 that can keep a 1 's valuation at least 16. Let us first assume g 6 ∈ X 1 and hence v 1 (X 1 ) ≥ 17. Now, to ensure v 3 (X 3 ) ≥ 10 we need to allocate g 5 and g 7 to a 3 . We are left with goods g 1 , g 2 , g 3 and g 4 . In order to ensure v 2 (X 2 ) ≥ 15, we definitely need to allocate g 1 , g 3 and g 4 to a 2 . Now even if we allocate the remaining good g 2 to a 1 we will have v 1 (X 1 ) = v 1 ({g 2 , g 6 }) = 19 < 20 = v 1 ({g 1 , g 3 }) ≤ v 1 (X 2 \ {g 4 }). Therefore a 1 will strongly envy a 2 . Thus g 6 / ∈ X 1 . If g 6 / ∈ X 1 and v 1 (X 1 ) ≥ 16, X 1 must contain g 3 (the total valuation for a 1 of all the goods other than g 3 and g 7 is less than 16). We need to consider several subcases.
Assume g 1 ∈ X 1 first. Since X 1 already contains g 1 and g 3 , the goods that can be allocated to a 2 and a 3 are g 2 , g 4 , g 5 , g 6 and g 7 . In order to ensure v 2 (X 2 ) ≥ 15 we need to allocate g 4 , g 5 and g 7 to a 2 . Even if we allocate all the remaining goods (g 2 and g 6 ) to a 3 , we have v 3 (X 3 ) = v 3 ({g 3 , g 6 }) = 10 < 11 = v 3 ({g 5 , g 7 }) ≤ v 3 (X 2 \ {g 4 }). Therefore a 3 will strongly envy a 2 .
Thus g 1 / ∈ X 1 . Since neither g 1 nor g 6 belongs to X 1 , the only way to ensure v 1 (X 1 ) ≥ 16 is to at least allocate g 2 , g 3 and g 4 to a 1 (we can allocate more). Similarly, given that the goods not allocated yet are g 1 , g 5 , g 6 and g 7 , the only way to ensure v 1 (X 2 ) ≥ 15 is to allocate at least g 1 and g 5 to a 2 . Similarly, the only way to ensure v 3 (X 3 ) ≥ 10 now is to allocate at least g 6 to a 3 . We next show that adding g 7 to any one of the existing bundles will cause a violation of the EFX property.
• Adding g 7 to X 1 : a 2 strongly envies a 1 as v 2 (X 2 ) = 15 < 16 = v 2 ({g 3 , g 4 , g 7 }) = v 2 (X 1 \ {g 2 }).
• Adding g 7 to X 2 : a 3 strongly envies a 2 as v 3 (X 3 ) = 10 < 11 = v 3 ({g 5 , g 7 }) = v 3 (X 2 \{g 1 }).
• Adding g 7 to X 3 : a 1 strongly envies a 3 as v 1 (X 1 ) = 16 < 17 = v 1 ({g 6 }) = v 1 (X 3 \ {g 7 }).
Thus there exists no complete EFX allocations Pareto dominating X.
We now move on to the second example. We will modify the example in Table 3 to highlight some barriers in the existence of "efficient" EFX allocations. There have been quite a lot of recent work aiming at computing fair allocations that are also efficient. The common measures of efficiency in economics are "Pareto Optimality" (where we cannot make any single agent strictly better off without harming another agent) and "Nash welfare" (the geometric mean of the valuations of the agents). Quite recently Caragiannis et al. [CGH19] showed that there exists partial EFX allocations that are efficient (with good guarantees on Nash welfare). In particular they show, Theorem 22 ([CGH19]). Let X * = X * 1 , X * 2 , . . . , X * n be an allocation that maximizes the Nash welfare. Then, there exists a partial allocation Y = Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . , Y n such that
• Y is EFX.
•
). In the same paper they mention that if the following conjecture is true, then there exists complete EFX allocation that are efficient as well. 9
Conjecture 23. Adding an item to an instance that admits an EFX allocation results in another instance that admits an EFX allocation with Nash welfare at least as high as that of the partial allocation before. g 1 g 2 g 3 g 4 g 5 g 6 g 7 a 1 ε 3 + 6ε 5 2ε 5 10 − ε 3 ε 3 10 − 2ε 3 10 + 3ε 5 ε 5 a 2 ε 0 10 − ε 2 + ε 6 2ε 2 10 0 ε − ε 2 a 3 0 0 0 0 10 − ε 4 10 2ε 4 Table 4 : An instance where no complete EFX allocation has larger Nash welfare than the EFX allocation X for the first six goods defined in the text. The valuations are assumed to be additive and the entry in row i and column j is the value of good j for agent i; ε is positive, but infinitesimally small.
We will now show that this conjecture is false, hinting that EFX demands "too much fairness" and some "trade offs with efficiency" may be necessary. In particular, we will now construct an instance I now, such that there exists a partial EFX allocation X with Nash welfare NSW (X) strictly larger than the Nash welfare NSW (X ) of any complete EFX allocation X . From the example in Table 3 , it is clear that in any complete EFX allocations we need to decrease the valuation of one of the agents. The high level idea is to modify I to I such that the decrease in valuation of one of the agents is significantly more than the increase in valuation of the other agents.
Theorem 24. For the instance I with three agents and seven goods given in Table 4 , the allocation X = X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , where
is an EFX allocation of the first six good whose Nash welfare is larger than the Nash welfare of an complete EFX allocation. 10
Proof. Observe that NSW (X) = ((10 + 2ε 5 ) · (10 + ε) · (10)) 1/3 . Let X be a complete EFX allocation with maximum Nash welfare.
Lemma 25. X allocates the goods g 3 , g 5 and g 6 to distinct agents. Additionally,
• X 2 contains exactly one good from {g 3 , g 5 }.
• X 3 contains exactly one good from {g 5 , g 6 }.
Proof. Consider the following complete EFX allocationX = X 1 ,X 2 ,X 3 :
It is easy to verify thatX is EFX and NSW (X) = ((10+3ε 5 )(10+ε+ε 6 )(10−ε 4 )) 1/3 . Now since X is a complete EFX allocation with maximum Nash welfare, we have NSW (X ) ≥ NSW (X). If g 3 , g 5 and g 6 are not allocated to distinct agents, there is an agent a i who does not get any of these goods. The valuation of this agent is at most 4ε (since ε is the maximum valuation of any agent for any good outside the set {g 3 , g 5 , g 6 }). The valuation of the other two agents can be at most 3 · (10 + ε) + 4ε = 30 + 7ε (since ε is the maximum valuation of any agent for any good outside the set {g 3 , g 5 , g 6 } and 10 + ε upper bounds the maximum valuation of any good in {g 3 , g 5 , g 6 }). Thus NSW (X ) ≤ ((4ε) · (30 + 7ε) 2 ) 1/3 < NSW (X) for sufficiently small ε.
A similar argument shows that X 2 contains at least one good from {g 3 , g 5 } and X 3 contains at least one good from {g 5 , g 6 } (since these are the only goods that the agents value close to 10). Since the goods g 3 , g 5 and g 6 are allocated to distinct agents, a 2 will get exactly one good from {g 3 , g 5 } and a 3 will get exactly one good from {g 5 , g 6 }.
Let us denote the set {g 5 , g 6 , g 7 } as VAL 3 , the goods valuable for agent a 3 . Note that v 3 (X 3 ) = v 3 (X 3 ∩VAL 3 ). We will now prove our claim by studying the cases that arise depending on X 3 ∩ VAL 3 . By Lemma 25, X 3 ∩ VAL 3 is non-empty and contains exactly one of g 5 and g 6 . Thus X 3 ∩ VAL 3 can be {g 5 }, {g 6 }, {g 5 , g 7 } and {g 6 , g 7 } only.
Lemma 26. If X 3 ∩ VAL 3 = {g 5 }, then NSW (X ) < NSW (X).
Proof. We have that v 3 (X 3 ) = v 3 (X 3 ∩ VAL 3 ) = 10 − ε 4 . Lemma 25 implies that X 2 contains g 3 and X 1 contains g 6 . Note that X 1 cannot contain any other good other than g 6 as this will lead to a 3 strongly envying a 1 (note that v 3 (g 6 ) = 10 > 10 − ε 4 = v 3 (X 3 )). Therefore v 1 (X 1 ) = 10 + 3ε 5 . Now we distinguish two cases depending on whether X 2 contains g 1 or not.
• g 1 ∈ X 2 : In this case, X 2 = {g 1 , g 3 }, as otherwise a 1 strongly envies a 2 (note that v 1 (X 1 ) = 10 + 3ε 5 < 10 + 6ε 5 = v 1 ({g 1 , g 3 }), and hence v 2 (X 2 ) = v 2 ({g 1 , g 3 }) = 10 + ε + ε 6 − ε 2 . Thus
and hence NSW (X )/NSW (X) < 1.
• g 1 / ∈ X 2 : Then v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ v 2 (remaining items) = v 2 ({g 2 .g 3 , g 4 , g 7 }) = 10 + ε + ε 6 and hence
Proof. This proof follows the proof of Lemma 26 closely. We have v 3 (X 3 ) = v 3 (X 3 ∩ VAL 3 ) = 10 + ε 4 . Lemma 25 implies that X 2 contains g 3 and X 1 contains g 6 . We now distinguish two cases depending on whether {g 1 , g 4 } ⊆ X 2 or not.
• {g 1 , g 4 } ⊆ X 2 : Then a 1 strongly envies a 2 as v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ v 1 (remaining items) = v 1 ({g 2 , g 6 }) = 10 + 5ε 5 < 10 + 6ε 5 = v 1 ({g 1 , g 3 }) ≤ v 1 (X 2 \ {g 4 }).
• {g 1 , g 4 } ⊆ X 2 . Then v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ v 2 ({g 1 , g 2 , g 3 }) = 10 + ε − ε 2 + ε 6 (not giving the less valuable g 4 and giving everything else that remains). Also v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ v 1 ({g 1 , g 2 , g 4 , g 6 }) = 10 + 2ε 3 + 11ε 5 . Thus v 1 (X 1 ) v 1 (X 1 ) = 1 + 2ε 3 + 9ε 5 10 + 2ε 5 , v 2 (X 2 ) v 2 (X 2 ) = 1 − ε 2 − ε 6 10 + ε , and v 3 (X 3 ) v 3 (X 3 ) = 1 + ε 4 10 and hence NSW (X ) < NSW (X).
Lemma 28. If X 3 ∩ VAL 3 = {g 6 , g 7 }, then NSW (X ) < NSW (X).
Proof. We have v 3 (X 3 ) = v 3 (X 3 ∩ VAL 3 ) = 10 + 2ε 4 . By Lemma 25, one each of g 3 and g 5 will be allocated to a 2 and a 1 . We next argue g 1 ∈ X 1 . If g 1 / ∈ X 1 then v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ max (v 1 ({g 3 }), v 1 ({g 5 })) + v 1 ({g 2 , g 4 })
= (10 − ε 3 ) + ε 3 + 2ε 5 < 10 + 3ε 5
= v 1 ({g 6 })
= v 1 (X 3 \ {g 7 }) and hence a 1 strongly envies a 3 . Therefore, g 1 ∈ X 1 . But still we have v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ max (v 1 ({g 3 }), v 1 ({g 5 })) + v 1 ({g 1 , g 2 , g 4 }) = (10 − ε 3 ) + (2ε 3 + 8ε 5 ) = 10 + ε 3 + 8ε 5 . However since g 1 ∈ X 1 we have that v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ max (v 2 ({g 3 }), v 2 ({g 5 })) + v 2 ({g 2 , g 4 }) = 10 + 2ε 2 . Thus v 1 (X 1 ) v 1 (X 1 ) = 1 + ε 3 + 6ε 5 10 + 2ε 5 , v 2 (X 2 ) v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ 1 − ε − 2ε 2 10 + ε , and v 3 (X 3 ) v 3 (X 3 ) = 1 + 2ε 4 10 and hence NSW (X ) < NSW (X).
Lemma 29. If X 3 ∩ VAL 3 = {g 6 } and g 3 ∈ X 2 then NSW (X ) < NSW (X).
Proof. We have v 3 (X 3 ) = v 3 (X 3 ∩ VAL 3 ) = 10. Since g 3 and g 5 are allocated to a 1 and a 2 respectively, and g 3 ∈ X 2 , we have g 5 ∈ X 1 by Lemma 25. We now distinguish two cases depending on whether g 1 ∈ X 2 or not.
• g 1 ∈ X 2 : Then X 2 cannot contain any other goods than g 1 and g 3 as this will lead to a 1 strongly envying a 2 : v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ v 1 (remaining items) ≤ v 1 ({g 2 , g 4 , g 5 , g 7 }) = 10 − ε 3 + 3ε 5 < 10 + 6ε 5 = v 1 ({g 1 , g 3 }). Therefore v 2 (X 2 ) = v 2 ({g 1 , g 3 }) = 10 + ε − ε 2 + ε 6 . Also note that v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ v 1 ({g 2 , g 4 , g 5 , g 7 }) = 10 − ε 3 + 3ε 5 . In that case, the valuations of both a 1 and a 2 decrease and that of a 3 does not increase. Thus NSW (X ) < NSW (X).
• g 1 / ∈ X 2 : Then X 2 cannot contain both of g 4 and g 7 as this will lead to a 1 strongly envying a 2 : v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ v 1 (remaining goods) = v 1 ({g 1 , g 2 , g 5 }) = 10 − ε 3 + 8ε 5 < 10 = v 1 ({g 3 , g 4 }) = v 1 (X 2 \ {g 7 }). Therefore, v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ max (v 2 ({g 4 }), v 2 ({g 7 })) + v 2 (remaining items) ≤ max (v 2 ({g 4 }), v 2 ({g 7 }))+v 2 ({g 2 , g 3 }) = 10+ε−2ε 2 +ε 6 and v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ v 1 ({g 1 , g 2 , g 4 , g 5 , g 7 }) = 10 + 9ε 5 . Thus v 1 (X 1 ) v 1 (X 1 ) = 1 + 7ε 5 10 + 2ε 5 , v 2 (X 2 ) v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ 1 − 2ε 2 − ε 6 10 + ε , and v 3 (X 3 ) v 3 (X 3 ) = 1 and hence NSW (X ) < NSW (X).
Lemma 30. If X 3 ∩ VAL 3 = {g 6 } and g 3 / ∈ X 2 then NSW (X ) < NSW (X).
Proof. We have v 3 (X 3 ) = v 3 (X 3 ∩ VAL 3 ) = 10. Since g 3 / ∈ X 2 , we have g 5 ∈ X 2 and g 3 ∈ X 1 by Lemma 25. We now distinguish two cases depending on whether g 7 ∈ X 2 or not.
• g 7 ∈ X 2 : Then X 2 cannot contain any other goods than g 5 and g 7 , as this will lead to a 3 strongly envying a 2 : v 3 (X 3 ) = 10 < 10 + ε 4 = v 3 ({g 5 , g 7 }). Therefore v 2 (X 2 ) = v 2 ({g 5 , g 7 }) = 10 + ε − ε 2 and v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ v 1 (remaining items) = v 1 ({g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 }) = 10 + ε 3 + 8ε 5 . Thus v 1 (X 1 ) v 1 (X 1 ) = 1 + ε 3 + 6ε 5 10 + 2ε 5 , v 2 (X 2 ) v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ 1 − ε 2 10 + ε , and v 3 (X 3 ) v 3 (X 3 ) = 1 and hence NSW (X ) < NSW (X).
• g 7 / ∈ X 2 : Then X 2 cannot contain both of g 1 and g 4 as this will lead to a 1 strongly envying a 2 : v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ v 1 (remaining goods) = v 1 ({g 2 , g 3 , g 7 }) = 10 − ε 3 + 3ε 5 < 10 − ε 3 + 6ε 5 = v 1 ({g 1 , g 5 }) = v 1 (X 2 \ {g 4 }). Now we consider two cases depending on whether g 1 ∈ X 2 or not.
g 1 ∈ X 2 : Then X 2 cannot have g 4 . Thus v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ v 2 ({g 1 }) + v 2 (remaining items) = v 2 ({g 1 }) + v 2 ({g 2 , g 5 }) = 10 + ε = v 2 (X 2 ). Note next that X 1 cannot have all of the remaining goods g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , g 7 as this will lead to a 2 strongly envying a 1 : v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ 10+ ε < 10+ε+ε 6 = (10−ε 2 +ε 6 )+(2ε 2 )+(ε−ε 2 ) = v 2 ({g 3 , g 4 , g 7 }) = v 2 ({g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , g 7 }\ {g 2 }). Therefore, X 1 is a strict subset of {g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , g 7 } and it should contain g 7 (as we are in the case where neither X 2 nor X 3 can have g 7 ). Since a 1 's valuation for g 7 is strictly less than its valuation for any of g 2 , g 3 and g 4 , we have that v 1 (X 1 ) < v 1 ({g 2 , g 3 , g 4 }) = v 1 (X 1 ). Since we are in the case where v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ v 2 (X 2 ) and v 3 (X 3 ) = v 3 (X 3 ), we have NSW (X ) < NSW (X).
g 1 / ∈ X 2 : Then v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ v 2 (remaining items) = v 2 ({g 2 , g 4 , g 5 }) = 10 + 2ε 2 and v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ v 1 ({g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , g 7 }) = 10 + ε 3 + 9ε 5 . Thus v 1 (X 1 ) v 1 (X 1 ) = 1 + ε 3 + 7ε 5 10 + 2ε 5 , v 2 (X 2 ) v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ 1 − ε − 2ε 2 10 + ε , and v 3 (X 3 ) v 3 (X 3 ) = 1 and hence NSW (X ) < NSW (X).
Lemmas 29 and 30 immediately imply the following lemma.
Lemma 31. If X 3 ∩ VAL 3 = {g 6 }, then NSW (X ) < NSW (X).
We are now ready to complete the proof. Lemma 25 implies that a 3 gets exactly one good from {g 5 , g 6 }. Thus X 3 ∩ VAL 3 = ∅ and {g 5 , g 6 } ⊆ X 3 ∩ VAL 3 . Thus X 3 ∩ VAL 3 ∈ {{g 5 } , {g 6 } , {g 5 , g 7 } , {g 6 , g 7 }}. However, Lemmas 26, 27, 28 and 31 imply that in all of these cases, NSW (X ) < NSW (X).
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that EFX allocations always exist when we have three agents with additive valuations. Our proof is constructive and leads to a pseudo-polynomial algorithm. We have identified some crucial barriers in the current techniques and have overcome them with newer techniques. We feel that this is a start to resolving the bigger open problem for existence of EFX allocations when we have n agents.
Our proofs crucially use additivity and does not generalize for more general valuation functions like submodular or subadditive. Therefore another ideal next step would be to investigate EFX allocations with three agents, but more general valuations.
We also showed some barriers to finding efficient EFX allocations (EFX allocations with high Nash social welfare). While efficient approximate EFX allocations or efficient EFX allocations with charity exists, it is not clear how much efficiency we can guarantee for complete EFX allocations -in a way how much trade off with efficiency is required to guarantee fairness.
